I'm a fourth-year graduate student within the Economics and Theory group of the EECS Department at Northwestern, advised by Jason Hartline. My interests broadly lie in overlaps of computer science (especially theory) with game theory and economics. When time allows, I play with maps and bikes over at sweetopenroads.com.
- Mechanism Design in complicated settings - when bidders are risk averse, or cooperate toward outcomes.
- Risk aversion in network routing games - in most real world settings, players in routing games are risk averse, yet few of our models and assumptions support this.
- Graph algorithms - encoding, planning and routing.
things to read
- Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents, with Hu Fu and Jason Hartline. EC 2013.
- A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, with Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens. EC 2013.
- Coopetitive Ad Auctions, with Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens. Working paper, presented at EC 2013 Workshop on Ad Auctions.
- The concavity of atomic splittable congestion games with non-linear utility functions. Working paper, presented at EC 2012 Workshop on Risk Aversion in Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design.
- Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique, with Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer and Chien-Chung Huang. SODA 2009.
- email: darrell dot hoy at gmail
- office: Ford 3-227