I am a graduate student within the Economics and Theory group of the EECS Department at Northwestern, advised by Jason Hartline. My interests broadly lie in overlaps of computer science (especially theory) with game theory and economics.
I am currently in the Boston area visiting at Harvard EconCS.
I am also on the job market this year! Contact me for research and teaching statements.
- Risk-aversion in game theory and mechanism design
- Mechanism design without truthfulness
- Inference in auction settings, particularly without solving for equilibrium
- Approximately Optimal Risk-averse Routing Policies via Adaptive Discretization, with Evdokia Nikolova. To appear, AAAI 2015.
- On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Atomic Splittable Flow Games, with Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer and Chien-Chung Huang. To appear, Mathematics of Operations Research.
- Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue, with Jason Hartline and . EC 2014.
- Shopping with Bonus Money: eBay, loyalty schemes and consumer spending, with Elizabeth Churchill, Atish Das Sarma and Kamal Jain. Working paper, presented at #CHIMoney 2014.
- Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents, with Hu Fu and Jason Hartline. EC 2013.
- A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, with Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens. EC 2013.
- Coopetitive Ad Auctions, with Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens. Working paper, presented at EC 2013 Workshop on Ad Auctions.
- The concavity of atomic splittable congestion games with non-linear utility functions. Working paper, presented at EC 2012 Workshop on Risk Aversion in Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design.
- Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique, with Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer and Chien-Chung Huang. SODA 2009.
- email: darrell dot hoy at gmail
- office: Ford 3-227